Fama LatAm Climate Turnaround Fund

Management Report

3Q26



fama
re.capital

Table of Contents

CIO Letter 3

LatAm Climate Turnaround Fund (CTF) 8

Climate Dashboard 18

- Portfolio Overview 18
- Company Overview 20

Methodological Notes 23

CIO Letter

For an investor, competitive advantage is the ability to earn returns above the cost of capital for an extended period without competitors being able to eliminate that spread. Its more traditional sources are well known: brand, scale, intellectual property, cost and network effects, among others.

There is, however, a less discussed category. Some companies start out with an advantage that a competitor cannot replicate simply by deploying more capital: location.

There are regions where trees grow exceptionally fast, soils retain more water, and certain rainfall regimes enable productivity levels that are difficult to replicate elsewhere. Nature alone, of course, does not constitute a moat. A company may enjoy an excellent geographic position and squander it. It may also own a scarce resource without being able to capture its value economically. But when a physical advantage that is hard to replicate meets sound management and a mechanism for economic capture, natural capital can become an extremely durable source of earnings.

This idea goes back to David Ricardo. In 1817, studying land of differing quality, Ricardo showed that agricultural prices had to cover the cost of farming the marginal land required to meet demand. Those who farmed better land captured the difference. Two centuries later, the logic remains the same. In markets for relatively homogeneous products, those who produce below the average market cost capture economic rent. The larger and more persistent the advantage over the marginal producer, the more valuable that position.

Climate change makes this differential particularly interesting, not because it is creating these advantages (many have existed for decades), but because it may change the value of resilience. Picture an efficient producer with a cost of 70 and a marginal producer with a cost of 90. The differential rent is 20. In a more adverse physical environment, the cost of the former may rise to 75 and that of the marginal producer to 110. The best producer

was also hurt by the climate, but its advantage widened from 20 to 35. It did not get better. The world around it got worse, faster.

Klabin helps make this abstraction concrete. Its eucalyptus forests yield close to 54 cubic meters per hectare per year, above the Brazilian average. It would be tempting to call this simply a gift of nature, but that would be wrong. The rainfall regime, temperatures and characteristics of the regions where it operates provide a favorable starting point. On top of that, the company has accumulated decades of genetics, research, forest management and operational know-how. Internally developed clones can achieve even higher yields. The proximity between forests and mills lowers logistics costs. Its mix of species broadens its industrial options.

The moat, therefore, is not the rain. It is a system built on a natural endowment that cannot be reproduced just anywhere.

This distinction matters. There is the original natural condition, such as climate, hydrology and soil. There is accumulated natural capital, which can improve or deteriorate over time. And there is the capital produced by the company, such as genetics, infrastructure, technology and know-how. The most compelling advantages emerge when these layers reinforce one another.

An accounting peculiarity also arises here. A machine goes on the balance sheet and is depreciated. Soil can lose organic matter for years without any corresponding line item in the financial statements. A company can cut investment in land management, boost short-term earnings and, at the same time, consume part of the asset that underpins its competitive advantage. Another may spend more today to preserve future productivity. For a while, the former appears more efficient. The difference only becomes evident when physical productivity begins to diverge.

That is why, in agriculture, average yield tells only part of the story. In the work we have carried out with SLC Agrícola on regenerative agriculture, resilience was one of the central issues. No-till farming, permanent soil cover, crop rotation and other practices



can improve the physical and biological characteristics that affect the soil's ability to cope with adverse conditions.

From a financial standpoint, the most interesting point may lie in the left tail of the distribution. Two soils may produce similar results in a benign year. When the rains fail, their responses can be very different. If a more resilient soil preserves a larger share of its productivity precisely in a bad year, the value lies not only in producing more on average. It lies in losing less when cash flow is most valuable.

This matters because the economic value of resilience is not linear. In normal years, the advantage may seem small. In extreme events, it becomes evident. The more frequent these events become, the greater the value of that protection tends to be.

None of this, however, guarantees that shareholders capture the rent. Water in a river basin may be extraordinarily scarce, and yet the regulator may pass virtually the entire benefit on to consumers. A piece of land may be exceptional and its value fully reflected in the price paid for it. An ecosystem may hold enormous economic value for society without generating any incremental return for a listed company.

That is why the question we ask is always the same: where, exactly, does nature enter the cash flow?

At Klabin, the answer runs through forest productivity, wood cost, capital turnover and logistics. In an agricultural company, it may show up in yields, production stability or lower losses under adverse conditions. In water utilities, the mechanism is different. In the case of Aguas Andinas, for example, the growing need for climate adaptation may require additional investment that, once recognized by the regulatory framework, becomes part of the business's economics. The benefits of resource scarcity do not automatically accrue to shareholders. What matters is the mechanism through which a portion of that need is converted into return on capital.

So far, however, we have described good assets. We have not necessarily described good investments.



A company may own the best forest or the best soil in the world and still be a poor investment if the market has already correctly priced that advantage. The inefficiency we are interested in is more specific. Analysts covering cyclical companies typically normalize earnings around a mid-cycle margin. High margins are treated as a peak and depressed margins as a trough. This discipline works when the economic structure that produced the historical record remains relatively stable.

But if the gap between the best producer and the marginal producer is widening structurally, part of what looks like a peak margin may in fact be a new normalized margin. If the resilience of a given soil repeatedly reduces losses in adverse years, the historical average may underestimate the future quality of that cash flow. If adaptation investments begin to enter a utility's regulated asset base, relying solely on the past may underestimate its reinvestment opportunity.

We do not need to create a line item called natural capital in our models. We need to identify where it alters variables we already know: cost, volume, margin, capex, return on capital, duration of growth or the distribution of cash flows. If we cannot build that bridge, we probably have a narrative, not an investment thesis.

And we also need to know how the thesis could be wrong. Technology may narrow differences currently imposed by geography. Irrigation, genetics and new materials may bring marginal producers closer to the best ones. Climate may degrade the very asset that seemed protected. A regulator may prevent the economic capture of scarcity. And we may simply overpay for a genuine advantage.

This last possibility may be the most important. A great asset is not necessarily a great investment.

Ricardo wrote about the “original and indestructible powers of the soil.” Today we know these powers are not indestructible. Perhaps precisely for that reason, the ability to preserve them is becoming more valuable.

What we look for in an investment is not nature for nature's sake. We look for a physical advantage that is hard to replicate, management capable of sustaining or expanding it, a



mechanism that converts that advantage into earnings, and a market price that underestimates the magnitude or duration of that rent.

Latin America is home to a rare concentration of such assets. This does not mean that all natural capital is a moat, nor that every company that controls it is a good investment.

Our job is to find out where the rent exists, who is able to capture it, and how much of it is not yet priced in.



LatAm Climate Turnaround Fund (CTF)

The third quarter marks a new stage in the build-out of the Climate Turnaround Fund. The portfolio, which until June comprised only four companies, now holds eight, with the additions of Klabin, Cemex, WEG and Rumo.

Two additional companies, both Chilean, have already been approved by the investment committee and are expected to be added to the portfolio as early as October. We expect to close the year with approximately 15 holdings.

In addition to the larger number of holdings, the quarter also marks the Fund's geographic expansion, as we invested for the first time in a Latin American company outside Brazil: Cemex, in Mexico.

During the Fund's first years of operation, we deliberately ran a smaller portfolio because there were two hypotheses we needed to test before scaling the strategy. The first was the existence of a sufficiently large pipeline of companies in which climate value creation was material relative to the company's market value. Finding a few good examples would not be enough. We needed to know whether there was enough depth to build a portfolio without compromising on business quality or discipline.

The second was stewardship. An important part of the strategy assumes that shareholder engagement can help make opportunities that companies have initially underexploited more tangible, measurable or visible. The first years showed that this dialogue is possible. Our work with SLC on regenerative agriculture is probably the most complete example, but not the only one. Going forward, we expect stewardship at the Fund to move beyond technical matters, such as emissions measurement and target setting, to encompass capital allocation and the measurement of climate opportunities.

We are very pleased with the results of both tests.



At the same time, our accumulated work has allowed us to articulate more clearly other ways in which climate transformation can create value for a company and its shareholders, beyond the Operational Decarbonization thesis, in which the transformation takes place fundamentally within the company itself.

To this, we have added Value Chain Decarbonization, in which the company creates value by helping reduce emissions across its value chain; Portfolio Transition, in which the opportunity lies in the progressive shift in the composition of assets and investments; and Transition Enablers, companies whose products, technologies or infrastructure enable other companies to carry out their own transformation.

These categories help organize our research, but they are not the reason to invest. A company does not enter the portfolio because it fits neatly into one of these four theses. It enters because we like the business, understand its competitive advantage, believe in its reinvestment and capital allocation capabilities, and find an appropriate relationship between value and price. The climate dimension must add something economically relevant to a thesis that already makes sense as an investment. Otherwise, it would be merely a characteristic of the company, not a reason to own it.

This is precisely what makes the new positions interesting. They are not just ways of gaining exposure to the climate transition. They are four very different businesses, with very different competitive advantages, in which we have identified additional value creation mechanisms arising from the way the economy is changing.

Klabin is perhaps the case in which this intersection between business, moat and climate is most evident. The company is not merely a pulp and packaging producer. It is an integrated system that starts in the forest, runs through pulp and paper production and ends, in several markets, in conversion into packaging. This integration gives the company important flexibility to decide where a ton of fiber generates the most value and reduces its dependence on any single market.

Much of the advantage originates in the forest. Brazil offers exceptionally favorable biological conditions for wood production and much shorter cycles than those found in



several competing geographies. But it would be wrong to attribute Klabin's moat to nature alone. The advantage was built over decades on top of this natural condition through genetics, forest management, silvicultural know-how, scale, forest location and proximity to its mills. It is the combination of natural capital and the assets accumulated by the company that creates a cost position that is difficult to replicate.

This is an especially compelling advantage because raw material accounts for a significant share of the business's cost base. Higher forest productivity does not simply mean producing more wood on the same hectare. It means less land and less capital tied up to sustain a given volume, faster incorporation of genetic improvements and a lower cost per ton delivered to the mill. The physical proximity between forest and mill adds another relevant advantage for a bulky product that is expensive to transport.

For much of the last decade, however, this quality was masked by a very intense investment cycle. The Puma and Puma II projects and the expansion of the forest base significantly increased the capacity and quality of the assets, but they also consumed capital, raised leverage and compressed free cash flow to shareholders. The inflection point that interests us is the transition from a company that needed to build its platform to one that can begin to harvest returns on what it has built. The thesis depends as much on this capital discipline as on the quality of the forests.

It is on top of this moat that climate value creation emerges. A first mechanism lies in natural capital itself. In a world where physical changes may erode the productivity of marginal forest assets, a highly productive, well-managed and genetically advanced base may widen its relative advantage. The question is not how much carbon the forest absorbs, but whether that forest allows Klabin to keep producing fiber at a cost that less advantaged competitors cannot match.

A second mechanism lies in traceability. The European Union will begin enforcing the main obligations of the EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR) from December 30, 2026. Wood-derived products will need to be accompanied by evidence of origin and of the absence of deforestation or forest degradation. Klabin has already put in place a system



that links the wood to the end product using georeferenced data and makes this traceability available to its customers.

It is important to understand the economic nature of this advantage. We are not assuming there will be an explicit premium per ton simply because the fiber is EUDR-compliant. The value may materialize in a subtler and probably more durable way, through market access, lower compliance costs, lower risk for the customer and a preference for suppliers able to demonstrate the origin of their raw material. In an industry where some participants rely on more fragmented and harder-to-trace supply chains, what for Klabin is an extension of a system it already has may represent additional cost and complexity for others.

There is also a third dimension in the customer chain. Many buyers of paper, paperboard and fluff pulp (a raw material for diapers and sanitary products) need to reduce their own Scope 3 emissions. Fiber produced with a competitive energy mix and forest base can help them do so. Once again, what we need to determine is whether this difference translates into economic value for Klabin, whether through mix, market share, customer retention or pricing. A ton of carbon, on its own, does not enter our analysis. Customer behavior does.

Cemex is perhaps the purest expression of the Operational Decarbonization thesis among the new positions. But the case for owning Cemex begins long before any discussion of carbon.

Cement is a local business. The product has a low value-to-weight ratio, is expensive to transport over long distances and depends on access to limestone, plants, terminals, distribution and customer relationships. This creates regional markets in which scale, logistics density and asset positioning matter enormously. A well-located plant, close to raw materials and end markets, can have a moat that would not be apparent from looking only at the product, which appears to be a commodity.

Over decades, Cemex has built a network of cement, aggregates and concrete assets, with particularly relevant positions in Mexico, the United States and Europe. Integration



with concrete also matters. While cement can travel some distance, ready-mix concrete has a much shorter transport window. Local presence, distribution and the ability to supply different products to the same customer increase density and make the network harder to replicate.

It is in this economic context that decarbonization must be analyzed. Cement's greatest challenge is not just the energy used to heat the kiln. The production of clinker, an intermediate product obtained by firing limestone and clay at high temperatures and the main component of cement, releases CO_2 in the chemical reaction of limestone calcination itself. That is why the clinker factor, the proportion of clinker used to produce cement, is one of the most important variables in the industry's climate economics.

Reducing the clinker factor means producing the same amount of cementitious material using less of the component that accounts for a large share of emissions and thermal energy consumption. This can be achieved by replacing part of the clinker with other materials, using additives, modifying formulations and improving the reactivity of the clinker itself. It is a carbon reduction, but it can also be a reduction in cost per ton. This overlap is exactly the kind of climate value creation we look for.

Cemex reduced its global clinker factor to 70.1% in 2025, the lowest level in its history and the seventh consecutive year of decline. The process has been accompanied by greater use of alternative materials and by engineering work to maintain strength and quality with less clinker. In parallel, the company uses alternative fuels in its kilns, replacing fossil fuels and, in some markets, avoiding both fuel costs and carbon costs. Cemex itself has reported that alternative fuels and avoided emissions in regulated markets generated material savings.

It is important not to treat all these levers the same way. Reducing the clinker factor at lower cost and with preserved quality can be a structural economic improvement. Replacing fossil fuel with waste can likewise reduce both cost and emissions. Carbon capture, on the other hand, may still require significant capital and a remuneration mechanism that allows for an adequate return. Lumping everything under the heading of “decarbonization” would hide important differences.



Europe makes this discussion particularly interesting. As the EU ETS phases out free allowances and CBAM begins to change the economics of imports, carbon intensity is having an increasingly tangible effect on producers' competitive positions. Cemex has argued that its lower intensity across part of its European asset base should allow it to navigate this transition with a better carbon cost position than marginal producers and more carbon-intensive importers.

This is the essence of climate value creation: it strengthens an existing moat. A local, well-positioned plant with privileged access to customers already has value. If it can produce each ton using less clinker, less fossil fuel and less carbon than its competitors, the transition can widen an advantage that already existed. This is very different from buying a poor company because it has a large opportunity to reduce emissions.

WEG occupies a different position. It is a Transition Enabler, but that label means little without first understanding the business.

WEG's moat was built over decades on engineering, manufacturing efficiency, vertical integration, customer proximity and an extraordinary ability to reinvest in new products and geographies without eroding returns. Motors remain a core part of the company, but today the portfolio includes drives, automation, generation, transmission, transformers and a range of equipment that connects electricity generation and consumption.

This breadth matters because the energy transition does not depend on a single technology. Even if a given generation technology loses share, the electrification of the economy will continue to require grids, motors, transformers, controls, storage and equipment to integrate increasingly complex systems. WEG participates in many of these markets without needing to predict precisely which one will become dominant.

Energy efficiency is perhaps the simplest example. A more efficient motor consumes less electricity to deliver the same power. For the customer, this is not an abstract climate decision. It means operating savings over the equipment's useful life. When efficiency standards become more stringent or energy becomes more expensive, the total cost of ownership of higher-efficiency equipment becomes more attractive. A company that can

produce this equipment with scale, reliability and global service support is well positioned to capture demand.

The same logic applies to grid expansion. More distributed generation, intermittent renewables, data centers, electric mobility and industrial electrification require very significant investment in transmission and distribution. Transformers, control equipment and automation are becoming bottlenecks in infrastructure that has suffered from years of underinvestment. The transition expands the addressable market for products in which WEG already competes.

But WEG is perhaps also the best example of why climate value creation alone does not settle an investment decision. Few investors need to be convinced that it is a high-quality company. Nor do many overlook the opportunities associated with electrification. For that very reason, price is central. A great business can deliver mediocre returns if its future value is already fully priced in. Our work on WEG is not to uncover a good climate story. It is to estimate how much additional growth the transition can generate, how much capital will be required to meet it, how long elevated returns can persist and how much of this is already reflected in the company's valuation.

Rumo is a Value Chain Decarbonization thesis, and this distinction is important. The thesis is not the decarbonization of Rumo's own locomotives. The potentially much greater value lies in decarbonizing its customers' logistics chains.

Once again, the moat starts with the business. A rail network is one of the hardest assets to replicate in any economy. It requires concessions, thousands of kilometers of track, terminals, port access, locomotives, railcars, control systems and continuous investment over decades. More importantly, the value of each segment increases when it connects to a network capable of carrying cargo from a producing region to a port or consumption hub. The infrastructure therefore has a network characteristic that a standalone asset cannot replicate.

This is particularly relevant for Brazilian agribusiness. Production has expanded and shifted toward regions very far from the ports. Trucks are indispensable for the first mile



and will remain so, but relying exclusively on roads to move large volumes over long distances is energy-inefficient. Rail can cover this part of the route with much lower fuel consumption and emissions per ton-kilometer.

Rumo estimates that rail emits approximately eight times less CO_2 per ton-kilometer than road transport and calculates that its operations avoided around seven million tons of emissions in 2025 compared with moving the same volumes by truck.

This alone would not yet constitute climate value creation. The economic case emerges at the customer level.

An agricultural trading company, a pulp producer or an industrial company with meaningful Scope 3 reduction targets has few levers to change logistics emissions once cargo leaves its facilities. The choice of transport mode is one of them. Shifting a growing share of long-haul volumes to rail can simultaneously reduce logistics costs and the chain's carbon footprint.

In this context, Rumo's solution delivers two things to the same customer: competitive freight and supply chain decarbonization. The value need not appear as an explicit green premium. It may show up in longer contracts, a higher share of rail in the customer's total logistics, new cargo flows, joint investment in terminals and rolling stock, or a preference for a solution that helps the customer meet its own climate commitments.

Some relationships already illustrate this logic. The company has been developing long-term operations and joint investments with customers such as Cofco, Suzano and CBA, increasing rail's share in supply chains in which logistics is economically relevant and material to emissions.

The expansion into Mato Grosso may broaden this opportunity because it brings the railway closer to the point of production. The shorter the road distance to the terminal and the longer the distance traveled by train, the greater both the logistics savings and the reduction in system emissions tend to be. For the CTF, this is the essence of the thesis: Rumo can create value by helping its customers decarbonize an important part of their supply chain without asking them to sacrifice economic returns.

The risk, once again, lies in capital. Railways are excellent businesses when the infrastructure is well utilized and investment generates adequate returns. They are far less attractive businesses when costly projects are built for demand that is slow to materialize. Rumo's thesis, therefore, will not be validated by tons of CO_2 avoided. It will be validated by the incremental return on the corridors built, volume growth, rail's share of customers' logistics and the company's ability to capture a reasonable share of the economic value it creates for them.

These new positions were initiated in a quarter in which the market environment made this kind of distinction especially important. Globally, equity markets remained resilient despite a sharp rise in long-term interest rates, much higher oil prices and a challenging geopolitical backdrop. The 10-year Treasury yield ended the quarter above 5%, while the main global indices remained close to their highs, an uncomfortable combination for assets whose valuation depends on very distant cash flows.

Within the portfolio itself, dispersion was wide. Companies tied to the domestic cycle and some agricultural positions posted strong gains, while other assets were penalized by interest rates, currencies, commodities or business-specific issues. This dispersion is healthy for portfolio construction because it makes it clearer that we are not trying to predict a single state of the world.

Klabin, Cemex, WEG and Rumo have very different economic drivers, geographies and durations. The fact that they share a climate value creation dimension does not mean they will behave in the same way.

The move from four to eight companies, therefore, changes more than the portfolio's diversification. It begins to allow more explicit management of the relationship between expected return and risk. One position may offer excellent upside and still add too much to a macroeconomic exposure already present in other companies. Another may have a somewhat lower expected return but protect the portfolio in certain states of the world.




With fifteen or sixteen positions, which we expect to reach by year-end, position sizing ceases to be a simple reflection of individual conviction and becomes a central part of return generation and risk management.

This also raises the opportunity cost. A new company does not compete against an abstract universe. It competes with adding to our positions in Klabin, Cemex or Rumo; with trimming WEG at a given valuation; or simply with holding cash. The fact that a company meets our quality criteria and offers relevant climate value creation does not mean it merits capital at that moment.

This will be the main task of the next phase.

The first years showed that there is a broad pipeline of companies in which climate transformation can be translated into economic value creation and that stewardship can be an effective part of the investment process. The current portfolio allows us to move on to the most important question: which of these opportunities offer the best balance between business quality, durability of the moat, magnitude of climate value creation, valuation and risk.

It is this comparison, company by company, that will shape the CTF's portfolio construction going forward.



Performance of CTF portfolio companies in 3Q26*

**Includes only companies held in the portfolio throughout the entire quarter. Klabin, Cemex, Rumo and WEG, which were acquired during September 2026, are excluded.*

Climate Dashboard

Portfolio Overview

Profile			Emissions					Stewardship	
Company	SBTi	CDP Climate	Priority scopes	Emissions ($MtCO_2e$)	Distribution by scope	Emissions (vs. prior year)	Intensity (latest year vs. peak year)	Transition thesis	Engagement stage
Banco do Brasil[1]	◐	A	S3*	17.0* (2024)		+15%* ↗	Financed/credit*: -3% ↘ 2024 vs. 2021	Portfolio Transition	● — ○ — ○ — ○
Cemex[2]	●	A	S1+S2	40.1		-6%*↘	S1+S2/US$: -19% ↘ 2025 vs. 2023	Operational Decarbonization	● — ○ — ○ — ○
Klabin[3]	●	A	S3	4.0		-1% ↘	n/a	Value Chain Decarbonization	● — ○ — ○ — ○
MBRF[4]	●	A	S1+S3	66.6		+2% ↗	S1+S2/t: -18% ↘ S3/t: -4% ↘ 2025 vs. 2024	Operational Decarbonization	● — ● — ○ — ○
Rumo[5]	○	B	S3	1.5		+7% ↗	S1/TKU: -6% ↘ 2025 vs. 2023	Value Chain Decarbonization	● — ○ — ○ — ○
Sabesp[6]	○	B	S1+S2	2.4		+0.4% ↗	S1+S2+S3/revenue*: -41% ↘ 2025 vs. 2020	Operational Decarbonization	● — ● — ○ — ○
SLC Agrícola[7]	○	B	S1+S2+S3	2.8		+11% ↗	S1+S2 net/t: -32% ↘ 2025 vs. 2024	Operational Decarbonization	● — ● — ● — ○
WEG[8]	●	A	S1+S2+S3	25.2		-10% ↘	S1+S2/revenue: -28% ↘ S3/value added: -23% ↘ 2025 vs. 2023	Transition Enablers	● — ○ — ○ — ○

Distribution by scope: Scope 1 Scope 2 Scope 3

● SBTi-validated targets ◐ SBTi submission in progress ○ Targets based on other methodologies

Intensity: scopes and denominator indicated in each cell. The change compares the most recent year with the highest value in the series available for each company; series cover different time spans.

Engagement stage: ●——○——○——○ each filled circle indicates a stage reached, from Stage 1 (Dialogue) to Stage 4 (Outcomes).

Stage 1 | Dialogue: Initial outreach to the company and building a relationship of trust.

Stage 2 | Planning: Joint definition of an action plan within the engagement strategy, with interactions aimed at refining it and initiating its implementation.

Stage 3 | Implementation: Substantive execution of the action plan, evidenced over an annual engagement cycle.

Stage 4 | Outcomes: Achievement of at least one long-term goal of the engagement strategy, with changes incorporated into the company's strategies, policies, governance structures or practices.

Notes: Banco do Brasil: financed emissions from the corporate loan portfolio only, with partial coverage. Cemex: value in $MtCO_2$, not CO_2e. Not directly comparable with the other companies; reporting boundary changed in 2025. Sabesp: intensity per revenue, a complementary indicator. The company's −41% target uses tCO_2e per 1,000 m^3 of treated wastewater and is not measured by this indicator.

Company Overview

This section brings together our portfolio companies' climate indicators, drawn from publicly available information, which we use to monitor their progress and guide the Fund's engagement strategy.


Portfolio	Climate Target	GHG Emissions	Emissions Intensity

Banco do Brasil S.A.

By 2040:


−42% in the emissions intensity of the corporate loan portfolio.

Financed emissions (corporate portfolio, partial coverage)[9]



Note: Financed emissions for 2025 have not been published.

Emissions intensity per R$ billion in corporate loans[10]



Cemex, S.A.B. de C.V.

By 2030 (2020 baseline):

−31% in Scope 1 emissions per ton of cementitious material.

−58% in Scope 2 emissions per ton of cementitious material.


−25% in Scope 3 emissions per ton of purchased clinker and cement.

−42% in absolute Scope 3 emissions from fuels sold (use of sold products).

By 2050:


Net zero across the entire value chain.

Absolute CO_2 emissions by scope[11]



Note: Reporting boundary changed in 2025 (sale of operations in the Dominican Republic and Panama): not comparable with prior years.

Emissions intensity per ton of cement produced and per US dollar of revenue[12]



Klabin S.A.

By 2025:

Zero deforestation in the main commodities associated with deforestation.

By 2030 (2022 baseline):


-42% in absolute Scope 1 and 2 emissions.

-42% in absolute Scope 3 emissions.

By 2050:

Net zero across the entire value chain, with a 90% reduction in Scope 1, 2 and 3 emissions.

Absolute emissions by scope and removals[13]



MBRF Global Foods Company S.A.

By 2032:

-51% in Scope 1 and 2 emissions in poultry and pork operations.

-35.7% in Scope 3 emissions in poultry and pork operations.

By 2035:


-68% in Scope 1 and 2 emissions in beef operations.

-33% in Scope 3 emissions intensity in the beef supply chain.

Target achieved in 2025:


100% deforestation-free supply chain in the Amazon, Cerrado and other biomes.

Absolute emissions (Scopes 1+2+3)[14]



Note: 2023 data refer to Marfrig only; not comparable.

Emissions intensity per ton produced[15]




Rumo S.A.


By 2030 (2020 baseline):

-21.6% in specific GHG emissions (gCO_2e/TKU) from rail operations.

Absolute emissions by scope[16]



Emissions intensity per ton-kilometer transported[17]




Sabesp S.A.


By 2035 (2024 baseline):

- −15% in total emissions;
- −43% in Scope 2 through self-generation and clean energy;
- −41% in emissions intensity (tCO_2e per 1,000 m³ of treated wastewater).

Absolute emissions by scope[18]



Emissions intensity per R$ thousand of adjusted operating revenue (complementary to the target metric)[19]



SLC Agrícola S.A.


By 2030:

- Carbon neutrality in Scopes 1 and 2.
- 550,000 hectares Regenagri-certified.


Target achieved in 2021:

- Zero Deforestation Policy.

Absolute emissions by scope and biogenic removals[20]



Net emissions intensity per ton produced and per hectare cultivated[21]




WEG S.A.


By 2030 (2021 baseline):

- −52% in absolute Scope 1 and 2 emissions.
- −60% in Scope 3 emissions per unit of value added (R$).

Absolute emissions by scope[22]



Emissions intensity per R$ million of revenue and per R$ thousand of value added[23]



Methodological Notes

The indicators presented in this report were extracted from the companies' public disclosures and reflect the methodology and criteria adopted by each issuer. The information has not been independently verified by Fama Re.Capital. Improving the transparency, comparability and quality of disclosures is one of the Fund's engagement themes.

[1]Climate Dashboard, Banco do Brasil

Source: Banco do Brasil, 2025 GHG Inventory (Public Emissions Registry, FGV, published on 08/25/2026) and 2025 Annual Report, p.244. Note: Financed emissions (Scope 3, category 15, PCAF) and their intensity ($MtCO_2e$/R$ bn lent) cover only the corporate loan portfolio, with partial coverage, and do not represent the bank's total financed emissions. Dashboard figures refer to 2024. The 2025 financed emissions cycle had not been published as of the date of our review (October 2026).

[2]Climate Dashboard, Cemex

Source: Cemex, 2025 Integrated Report, p.224. Note: Emissions in $MtCO_2$ (CO_2 only, GCCA protocol, excluding CH_4 and N_2O). Market-based Scope 2 for the cement segment only. 2025 excludes the Dominican Republic and Panama, divested during the year, and prior years were not restated; therefore, part of the 2025 decline reflects divestment. SBTi-validated targets (1.5°C scenario, 2020 baseline), per the 2025 Integrated Report, p.282.

[3]Climate Dashboard, Klabin

Source: Klabin, ESG Dashboard (Climate Change and Energy section, updated on 09/16/2026). Note: Market-based Scope 2. Removals of 17.0 $MtCO_2e$ in 2025 are not included in the total and are not covered by the external verification of the inventory. The company does not publish emissions intensity.

[4]Climate Dashboard, MBRF

Source: MBRF, 2025 Integrated Report, p.78 and p.184-185. Note: Scopes 1, 2 (market-based) and 3. 2024-2025 = combined company (Marfrig + BRF); 2023 = Marfrig only, which creates a break in the series due to the change in reporting boundary. MBRF does not report removals. The 2025 vs. 2024 change compares the same boundary.

[5]Climate Dashboard, Rumo

Source: Rumo, 2025 Indicators Center, p.17-18. Note: Market-based Scope 2. Intensity = Scope 1 per net ton-kilometer (gCO_2e/TKU), the company's target metric. The 2025 increase stems from Scope 3 (capital goods).

[6]Climate Dashboard, Sabesp

Source: Sabesp, 2025 Sustainability Report, p.88-89 (published on 08/16/2026). Note: Scopes 1, 2 (location-based, as Sabesp does not report market-based) and 3. Intensity in tCO_2e (Scopes 1+2+3) per R$ thousand of adjusted operating revenue. Sabesp's −41% target uses tCO_2e per 1,000 m^3 of treated wastewater; the revenue-based indicator is complementary and does not measure progress toward the target.

[7]Climate Dashboard, SLC Agrícola

Source: SLC, 2025 Integrated Report, p.91-93. Note: Scopes 1, 2 and 3. Scope 2 is location-based throughout the series, the only method published by the company for 2023-2025. Intensity covers agricultural operations, in tCO_2e per ton produced and per hectare.

[8]Climate Dashboard, WEG

Source: WEG, 2025 Integrated Annual Report, p.64-67. Note: Market-based Scope 2. Intensity of Scopes 1+2 per net operating revenue and of Scope 3 per value added, the company's metrics. 2023-2024 series restated by WEG in the 2025 report.

[9]Appendix, Banco do Brasil, Financed emissions (corporate portfolio)

Source: Banco do Brasil, 2025 Annual Report, p.244. Note: Financed emissions (Scope 3, cat. 15, PCAF) cover only the corporate loan portfolio, with partial coverage, corresponding to 42.28% of the credit portfolio in 2024. They do not represent the bank's total financed emissions. Measurement began in base year 2021. 2025 cycle not published as of the date of our review (October 2026).

[10]Appendix, Banco do Brasil, Emissions intensity per R$ billion in corporate loans

Source: Banco do Brasil, 2025 Annual Report, p.244. Note: Intensity in $MtCO_2e$/R$ bn lent, same scope as note 9. 2025 cycle not published as of the date of our review (October 2026).

[11] Appendix, Cemex, Absolute CO_2 emissions by scope

Source: Cemex, 2025 Integrated Report, p.224 and p.231. Note: Values in $MtCO_2$, not CO_2e (GCCA protocol). Market-based Scope 2 for cement only. 2025 excludes divested operations (Dominican Republic and Panama); therefore, part of the decline reflects divestment, not reduction. Limited assurance by KPMG on 2025 only.

[12] Appendix, Cemex, Emissions intensity per ton of cement produced and per US dollar of revenue

Source: Cemex, 2025 Integrated Report, p.224. Note: Gross Scope 1 per ton of cementitious product ($kgCO_2/t$), the SBTi target metric, and Scopes 1+2 per US dollar of revenue ($kgCO_2$/US$). Revenue-based intensity is not assured.

[13] Appendix, Klabin, Absolute emissions by scope and removals

Source: Klabin, ESG Dashboard (updated on 09/16/2026); 2025 cross-checked against the FIF database. Note: Market-based Scope 2. Removals from planted and native forests are shown separately and are not included in the total. Limited assurance by Bureau Veritas on the 2025 Sustainability Report, with no indication of the indicators covered.

[14] Appendix, MBRF, Absolute emissions (Scopes 1+2+3)

Source: Marfrig Report (2023) and MBRF, 2025 Integrated Report (2024-2025). Note: Market-based Scope 2. 2023 refers to Marfrig only; 2024 and 2025 to MBRF (Marfrig + BRF). The 2023 bar is not comparable with the following years. MBRF does not report removals.

[15] Appendix, MBRF, Emissions intensity per ton produced

Source: Marfrig Reports (2023) and MBRF, 2025 Integrated Report (2024-2025). Note: From 2024 onward, the denominator was expanded from “beef” to “beef, poultry and pork”.

[16] Appendix, Rumo, Absolute emissions by scope

Source: Rumo, 2025 Indicators Center, p.17. Note: Market-based Scope 2. Scope 3 fluctuates with capital goods investment (decline in 2024 and increase in 2025), not with operating performance. Limited assurance by PwC on Scope 1 only. The total rises due to Scope 3 while Scope 1 intensity declines: the two series measure different dimensions.

[17] Appendix, Rumo, Emissions intensity per ton-kilometer transported

Source: Rumo, 2025 Indicators Center, p.18. Note: Intensity in gCO_2e per net ton-kilometer (TKU), considering Scope 1 only. This is the metric for the −21.6% target by 2030 (2020 baseline).

[18] Appendix, Sabesp, Absolute emissions by scope

Source: Sabesp, 2024 and 2025 Sustainability Reports. Third-party verified inventories (Public Emissions Registry, FGV). Note: The jump in Scope 3 from 2023 onward is methodological (inclusion of new categories), not operational. An additional category (employee commuting) was added in 2025.

[19] Appendix, Sabesp, Emissions intensity per R$ thousand of adjusted operating revenue

Source: Sabesp, 2025 Sustainability Report, p.89 and p.93; 4Q20, 4Q22 and 4Q24 Earnings Releases, p.4. Note: 2025 value published by Sabesp (107.98 tCO_2e/R$ mn). Prior years calculated by fama re.capital using the company's methodology; calculations available upon request. Sabesp's −41% target uses a different metric (tCO_2e per 1,000 m^3 of treated wastewater); this indicator is complementary and does not measure progress toward the target.

[20] Appendix, SLC Agrícola, Absolute emissions by scope and biogenic removals

Source: SLC, 2024 and 2025 Integrated Reports. Note: Scope 3 was expanded in 2023 to include fertilizers. The inventory is restated in each report. Scope 2 is location-based throughout the series, the only method published by the company for 2023-2025.

[21] Appendix, SLC Agrícola, Net emissions intensity per ton produced and per hectare cultivated

Source: SLC, 2024 and 2025 Integrated Reports. Note: Indicators limited to agricultural operations.

[22] Appendix, WEG, Absolute emissions by scope

Source: WEG, 2025 Integrated Annual Report, p.64-66. Note: Market-based Scope 2. Over 99% of emissions are Scope 3, almost entirely from the “use of sold products” category, which depends on sales volume and product useful-life assumptions. Changes in Scope 3 reflect this modeling and should not be read as an observed physical reduction. 2023-2024 series restated by WEG in the 2025 report and not covered by assurance.

[23] Appendix, WEG, Emissions intensity per R$ million of revenue and per R$ thousand of value added

Source: WEG, 2025 Integrated Annual Report, p.65 and p.67. Note: Scopes 1+2 per net operating revenue (tCO_2e/R$ mn) and Scope 3 per value added (tCO_2e/R$ thousand). Scope 3 per value added is the SBTi-validated target metric.



The information contained in this material is for informational purposes only. Investors should read the funds' regulations before making any investment decision. Past performance is no guarantee of future results. Reported returns are not net of taxes. No fund is guaranteed by the administrator, the investment manager or the Credit Guarantee Fund (Fundo Garantidor de Créditos – FGC).
To obtain the Regulations, Performance History, Prospectus and any additional information, please contact fama re.capital or the fund's administrator. When evaluating the performance of investment funds, an analysis over a period of at least 12 months is recommended.

Autorregulação ANBIMA

Gestão de Recursos